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Philadelphia is one of the great cities of the world. To the
student of history who remembers that Nineveh and Palmyra, Car-
thage and Thebes, and many another, have been great, populous and
wealthy, and then have passed entirely away from the thoughts and
lips of men, Philadelphia has yet a glory that shall live always.
Mohammedanism has its *Mecca, the cradle and the acme of its
hopes. Jew and Christian alike turn to Jerusalem. But to the
utmost verge of earth, and to the last syllable of recorded time, in
whatever language liberty and freedom shall be honored among
men, in whatever accents government "of the people, by the people
and for the people" shall be asserted, there Philadelphia shall be
remembered as the cradle of its birth. Her streets at some far
distant day may be overgrown with grass and her ruined and tot-
tering buildings may become the home of bats and birds of night;
but around her name will linger a luster that shall never depart.
There on 4 July, 1776, was proclaimed "Liberty throughout all
the land and to all the inhabitants thereof." And there too, eleven
years later, was another notable event, when on 17 September, 1787,
was issued to the world the Constitution of these United States. It
is of the latter-"its defects and the necessity for its revision"-that
I wish to present my views.
Just here it is well to call to mind the radical difference between
these two Conventions. That which met in 1776 was frankly dem-
ocratic. Success in its great and perilous undertaking was only
possible with the support of the people. The Great Declaration
was an appeal to the masses. It declared that all men were "created
equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights-among them
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-to secure which rights
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governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed; and that when government becomes destruc-
tive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it,
and institute a new government in such form as shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness." Never was the right of
revolution more clearly asserted or that government existed for the
sole benefit of the people, who-.were declared to be equal and
endowed with the right to change their government at will when it
did not subserve their welfare or obey their, wishes. Not a word
about property. Everything was about the people. The man was
more than the dollar then. And the Convention was in earnest.
Every member signed the Declaration, which was unanimously
voted. As Dr. Franklin pertinently observed, it behooved them "to
hang together or they would be-hanged separately."
The Convention which met in 1787 was as reactionary as the
other had been revolutionary and democratic. It bad its beginning
in commercial negotiations between the States. Wearied with a
long war, enthusiasm for liberty somewhat relaxed by the pressing
need to earn the comforts and necessities of life whose stores had
been diminished, and oppressed by the ban upon prosperity caused
by the uncertainties and impotence of the existing government of
the Confederacy, the Convention of 1787 came together. Ignoring
the maxim that government should exist only by the consent of
the governed, it sat with closed doors, that no breath of the popular
will should affect their decisions. To free the members from all
responsibility, members were prohibited to make copies of any reso-
lution. Any record of Yeas and Nays was forbidden and was kept
without the knowledge of the Convention. The journal was kept
secret, a vote to destroy it fortunately failed, and Mr. Madison's
copy was published only after the lapse of forty-nine years, when
every member had passed beyond human accountability. Only
12 States were ever represented, and one of these withdrew before
the final result was reached. Of its 65 members only 55 ever
attended, and so far from being unanimous, -only 39 signed the Con-
stitution, and some actively opposed its ratification by their own
States.
That the Constitution thus framed was reactionary was a matter
of course. There was, as we know, some talk of a royal govern-
ment with Frederick, Duke of York, second son of George the
Third, as King. Hamilton, whose subsequent great services as
Secretary of the Treasury have crowned him with a halo, and whose
tragic death has obliterated the memory of his faults, declared him-
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self in favor of the English form of government with its hereditary
Executive and its House of Lords, which he denominated "a most
noble institution." Failing in that, he advocated an Executive
elected by Congress for life, Senators and Judges for life, and Gov-
ernors of States to be appointed by the President. Of these he
secured, as it has proved, the most important from his tandpoint,
the creation of Judges for life. The Convention was aware that a
Constitution on Hamilton's lines could not secure ratification by the
several States. But the Constitution adopted was made as undem-
ocratic as possible, and was very far from responding to the condi-
tion, laid down in the Declaration of 1776, that all governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Hamil-
ton, in a speech to the Convention, stated that the members were
agreed that "we need to be rescued from the democracy." They
were rescued.
In truth, the consent of the governed was not to be asked. In
the new government the will of the people was not to control and
was little to be consulted. Of the three great departments of the
government-Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary-the people
were entrusted with the election only of the House of Representa-
tives, to wit, only one-sixth of the government, even if that House
had been made equal in authority and power with the Senate, which
was very far from being the case. The Declaration of 1776 was
concerned with the rights of man. The Convention of 1787 entirely
ignored them. There was no Bill of Rights and the guarantees
of the great rights of freedom of speech and of the press, freedom
of religion, liberty of the people to assemble, and right of petition,
the right to bear arms, exemption from soldiers being quartered
upon the people, exemption from general warrants, the right of trial
by jury and a grand jury, protection of the law of the land and pro-
tection from seizure of private property for other than public use,
and then only upon just compensation; the prohibition of excessive
bail or cruel and unusual punishment, and the reservation to the
people and the States of all rights not granted by the Constitution-
all these matters of the utmost importance to the rights of the people
--were omitted and were inserted by the first ten amendments only
because it was necessary to give assurances that such amendments
would be adopted in order to secure the ratification of the Constitu-
tion by the several States.
The Constitution was so far from being deemed satisfactory,
even to the people and in the circumstances of the time for which it
was framed, that, as already stated, only ii States voted for its
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adoption by the Convention, and only 39 members out of 55 attend-
ing signed it, some members subsequently opposing its ratification.
Its ratification by the conventions in the several States was carried
with the greatest difficulty, and in no State was it submitted to a vote
of the people themselves. Massachusetts ratified only after a close
vote and with a demand for amendments. South Carolina and New
Hampshire also demanded amendments, as also did Virginia and
New York, both of which voted ratification by the narrowest major-
ities and reserving to themselves the right to withdraw, and two
States rejected the Constitution and subsequently ratified only after
Washington had been elected and inaugurated-matters in which
they had no share.
George Washington was President of the Convention, it is true,
but as such was debarred from sharing in the debates. His ser-
vices, great as they were, had been military, not civil, and he left no
impress upon the instrument of union so far as known. Yet it was
admitted that but for his popularity and influence the Constitution
would have failed of ratification by the several States, especially in
Virginia. Indeed, but for his great influence the Convention would
have adjourned without putting its final hand to the Constitution, as
it came very near doing. Even his great influence would not have
availed but for the overwhelming necessity for some form -of gov-
ernment as a4 substitute for the rickety "Articles of Confederation,"
which were utterly inefficient and whose longer retention threat-
ened civil war.
An instrument so framed, adopted with such difficulty and ratified
after such efforts, and by such narow margins, could not have been
a fair and full expression of the consent of the governed. The
men that made it did not deem it perfect. Its friends agreed to
sundry amendments, ten in number, which were adopted by the first
Congress that met. The assumption by the new Supreme Court
of a power not contemplated, even by the framers of the Constitu-
tion, to drag a State before it as defendant in an action by a citizen
of another State, caused the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment.
The unfortunate method prescribed for the election of President
nearly caused a civil war in 18oi and forced the adoption of the
Twelfth Amendment, and three others were brought about as the
result of the great Civil War. The Convention of 1787 recognized
itself that the defects innate in the Constitution and which would be
developed by experience and the lapse of time, would require
amendments, and that instrument prescribed two different methods
by which amendments could be made.
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Our Federal Constitution was adopted 119 years ago. In that
time every State has radically revised its Constitution, and most of
them several times. Indeed, the Constitutionof New York requires
that the question of a Constitutional Convention shall be submitted
to its people at least once every twenty years. The object is that
the organic law shall keep abreast of the needs and wants of the
people and shall represent the will and progress of to-day, and shall
not, as is the case with the Federal Constitution, be hampered by
provisions deemed best by the divided counsels of a small handful of
men, in providing for the wants of the government of nearly a cen-
tury and a quarter ago. Had those men been gifted with divine
foresight and created a Constitution fit for this day and its devel-
opment, it would have been unsuited for the needs of the times in
which it was fashioned.
When the Constitution was adopted in 1787 it was intended for
3,ooo,ooo of people, scattered along the Atlantic slope, from Massa-
chusetts to the southern boundary of Georgia. We are now trying
to make it do duty for very nearly ioooooooo, from Maine to
Manila, from Panama and Porto Rico to the Pole. Then our pop-
ulation was mostly rural, for three years later, at the first Census in
i79o, we had but five towns in the whole Union which had as many
as 6,5oo inhabitants each, and only two others had over 4,000.
Now we have the second largest city on the globe, with over 4,000,-
ooo of inhabitants, and many that have passed the half million mark,
some of them of over a million population. Three years later, in
1790, we had 75 post-offices with $37,ooo annual post-office expendi-
tures. Now we have 75,000 post-offices, 35,o0o rural delivery
routes and a post-office appropriation of nearly $200,ooo,ooo.
During the first ten years the total expenditures of the Federal
Government, including payments on the Revolutionary debts, and
including even the pensions, averaged $Io,ooo,ooo annually. Now
the expenditures are seventy-five times as much. When the Consti-
tution was adopted Virginia was easily the first State in influence,
population and wealth, having one-fourth the population of the
entire Union. North Carolina was third, and New York, which
then stood fifth, now has double the population of the whole coun-
try at that date, and several other States have now a population
greater than the original Union, whose very names were then
unheard and over whose soil the savage and the buffalo roamed
unmolested. Steamboats, railroads, gas, electricity (except as a
toy in Franklin's hands), coal mines, petroleum, and a thousand
other things which are a part of our lives to-day, were undiscovered.
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Corporations, which now control the country and its govern-
ment, were then so few that not till four years later, in 1791, was
the first bank incorporated (in New York), and the charter for the
second bank was only obtained by the subtlety of Aaron Burr, who
concealed the banking privileges in an act incorporating a water
company-and corporations have had an affinity for water ever
since.
Had the Constitution been perfectly adapted to the needs and
wishes of the people of that day, we would still have outgrown it.
Time has revealed flaws in the original instrument, and it was, as
might be expected, wholly without safeguards against that enor-
mous growth of corporations, and even of individuals, in wealth
and power, which has subverted the control of the government.
The glaring defect in the Constitution was that it was not dem-
ocratic. It gave, as already pointed out, to the people-to the gov-
erned-the selection of only one-sixth of the government, to wit,
one-half-by far the weaker half-of the Legislative Department.
The other half, the Senate, was made elective at second hand by the
State Legislatures, and the Senators were given not only longer
terms, but greater power, for all Presidential appointments, and
treaties, were subjected to confirmation by the Senate.
The President was intended to be elected at a still further
remove from the people, by being chosen by electors, who, it was
expected, would be selected by the State Legislatures. The President
thus was to be selected at third hand, as it were. In fact, down till
after the memorable cbntest between Adams, Clay, Crawford and
Jackson, in 1824, in the majority of the States the Presidential elec-
tors were chosen by the State Legislatures, and they were so chosen
by South Carolina till after the Civil War, and, in fact, by Colorado
in 1876. The intention was that the electors should make independ-
ent choice, but public opinion forced the transfer of the choice of
electors from the Legislatures to the ballot-box, and then made of
them mere figure-heads, with no power but to voice the will of the
people, who thus captured the Executive Department. That
Department, with the House of Representatives, mark to-day the
extent of the share of the people in this government.
The Judiciary were placed a step still further removed from the
popular choice. The Judges were to be selected at fourth hand by a
President (intended to be selected at third hand) and subject to
confirmation by a Senate chosen at second hand. And to make the
Judiciary absolutely impervious to any consideration of the "con-
sent of the governed," they are appointed for life.
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It will be seen at a glance that a Constitution so devised was
intended not to express, but to suppress, or at least disregard, the
wishes and the consent of the governed. It was admirably adapted
for what has come to pass-the absolute domination of the govern-
ment by the "business interests" which, controlling vast amounts
of capital and intent on more, can secure the election of Senators
by the small constituencies, the Legislatures which elect them, and
can dictate the appointment of the Judges, and if they fail in that,
the Senate, chosen under their auspices, can defeat the nomination.
Should the President favor legislation and the House of Represen-
tatives pass the bill, the Senate, with its majority chosen by corpo-
ration influences, can defeat it; and if by any chance it shall yield
to the popular will and pass the bill, as was the case with the income
tax, there remains the Judiciary, who have assumed, without any
warrant, express or implied in the Constitution, the power to declare
any act unconstitutional at their own will and without responsibility
to any one.
The people's part in the government in the choice of the House
of Representatives, even when reinforced by the Executive, whose
election they have captured, is an absolute nullity in the face of the
Senate and the Judiciary, in whose selection the people have no
voice. This, therefore, is the government of the United States -a
government by Senate and Judges-that is to'say, frankly, by what-
ever power can control the selection of Senators and Judges.
What is that power? We know that it is not the American people.
Let us not be deceived by forms, but look at the substance.
Government rests not upon forms, but upon a true reply to the
question, "Where does the governing power reside?" The Roman
legions bore to the last day of the empire upon their standards the
words, "The Senate and the Roman People," long centuries after
the real power had passed from the curia and the comitia to the bar-
racks of the Pretorian Guards, and when there was no will in Rome
save that of their master. There were still Tribunes of the People,
and Consuls, and a Senate, and the title of a Republic; but the real
share of the people in the Roman government was the donation to
them of "bread and circuses" by their tyrants.
Years after the victor of Marengo had been crowned Emperor
and the sword of Austerlitz had become the one power in France,
the French coins and official documents still bore the inscription of
"French Republic"--"Ripublique Francaise."
In England to-day there is a monarchy in form, but we know
that in truth the real government of England is vested in a single
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House of Parliament, elected by the people, under a restricted suf-
frage; that the real Executive is not the King, but the Prime Min-
ister and his cabinet, practically elected by that House of Commons;
that the King has not even the veto power, except nominally, since
it has not been exercised in a single instance for more than 200 years,
and that the sole function of the House of Lords-a club of rich
men representing great vested interests-is in the exercise of a sus-
pensive veto (of which the King has been deprived), which is exer-
cised only till the Commons make up their mind the bill shall pass-
when the House of Lords always gives way, as the condition upon
which their continued existence rests. So in this country, we retain
the forms of a Republic. We still choose our President and the
House of Representatives by the people; but the real power does
not reside in them or in the people. It rests with those great
"interests" which select the majority of the Senate and the Judges.
This being the situation, the sole -remedy possible is by amend-
ment of the Constitution to make it democratic, and place the selec-
tion of these preponderating bodies in the hands of the people.
First, the election of Senators should be given to the people.
Even then consolidated wealth will secure some of the Senators;
but it would not be able, as now, at all times to count with absolute
certainty upon a majority of the Senate as its creature§. Five
times has a bill, proposing such amendment to the Constitution,
passed the House of Representatives by a practically unanimous
vote, and each time it has been lost in the Senate; but never by a
direct vote. It has always been disposed of by the chloroform
process of referring the bill to a committee, which never reports it
back, and never will. It is too much to expect that the great corpo-
rations which control a majority of the Senate will ever voluntarily
transfer to the people their profitable and secure hold upon supreme
power by permitting the passage of an amendment to elect Senators
by the people. The only hope is in the alternative plan of amend-
ment, authorized by the Constitution, to wit, the call of a Constitu-
tional Convention upon the application of two-thirds of the States,
to wit, thirty States. Afore than that number have already
instructed in favor of an amendment to elect Senators by the people.
It may be recalled here that in the Convention of 1787 Pennsyl-
vania did vote for the election of Senators by the people. A
strong argument used against this was that the farming interest,
being the largest, would control the House and that the Senate
could only be given to the commercial interests by making its mem-
bers elective by the Legislatures-which was prophetic-though the
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deciding influence was the fear of the small States that if the Senate
was elected by the people its membership would be based on popula-
tion.
It is high time that we had a Constitutional Convention, after the
lapse of nearly a century and a score of years. The same reasons
which have time and again caused the individual States to amend
their Constitutions imperatively require a Convention to adjust the
Constitution of the Union to the changed conditions of the times
and to transfer to the people themselves that control of the govern-
ment which is now exercised for the profit and benefit of the "inter-
est." Those interests, with all the power of their money and the
large part of the press which they own or control, will resist the call
of such a Convention. They will be aided, doubtless, by some of
the smaller States who may fear a loss of their equal representation
in the Senate. But in truth and justice it may be that there might
be some modification now in that respect without injury to the
smaller States. There is no longer any reason why Delaware, or
Nevada, or Rhode Island should have as many Senators as New
York, or Pennsylvania, or Illinois. It would be enough to grant to
every State having a million of inhabitants or less, one Senator, and
to allot to each State having over one million of inhabitants an addi-
tional Senator for every million above one million and for a frac-
tional part if over three-quarters of a million. This, while not put-
ting the Senate frankly on the basis of population, would remove the
dissatisfaction with the present unjust ratio and would quiet the
opposition to the admission of new States whose area and develop-
ment entitle them to self-government, but whose population does
not entitle them to two Senators.
The election of President is now made by the people, who have
captured it, though the Constitution did not intend the people should
have any choice in naming the Executive. The dangerous and
unsafe plan adopted in 1787 was changed in consequence of the nar-
rowly-averted disaster in i8oi. But the method in force still leaves
much to be desired. It readily lends itself to the choice of a minor-
ity candidate. It is an anomaly that i,ioo votes in New York (as
in 1884) should swing 7o electoral votes (35 from one candidate to
the other) and thus decide the result. The consequence is that
while, nominally, any citizen of the Republic is eligible to the Presi-
dency, only citizens of two or three of the larger States, with doubt-
ful electoral votes, are in fact eligible. All others are barred. For
proof of this, look at the history of our Presidential electors. For
the first forty years of the Union the presidents were confined to
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two States-Virginia and Massachusetts. Then there came a
period when the growing West required recognition, and Tennessee,
Ohio, and New York commanded the situation for the next sixteen
years. The Mexican War gave us a soldier who practically repre-
sented no State, and was succeeded by a New Yorker. Then for
the only time in our history "off States" had a showing, and Penn-
sylvania and New Hampshire had their innings. Since then the
successful candidates have been again strictly limited to "pivotal
States"-New York in the East and Illinois, Indiana and Ohio in
the West.
This condition is unsatisfactory. The magnetic Blaine from
Maine was defeated, as was Bryan from Nebraska. Had the for-
mer hailed from New York and the latter from Illinois, the electoral
votes and influence of those States would have secured their elec-
tion.
It would be dangerous, and. almost a certain provocation of civil
war, to change the election of President to a per capita vote by the
whole of the Union. Then a charge of a fraudulent vote at any
precinct or voting place, however remote, might affect the result;
and as frauds would most likely occur in those States where the
majorities are largest-as in Pennsylvania or Texas, Ohio or
Georgia-a contest would always be certain. Whereas, now,
frauds in States giving large majorities, unless of great enough
magnitude to change the electoral vote of the whole State, can have
no effect. The remedy is, preserving the electoral vote system as
now, and giving the smaller States, as now, the advantage of elec-
toral votes to represent their Senators, to divide the electoral vote
of each State according to the popular vote for each candidate, giv-
ing each his pro rata of the electoral vote on that basis, the odd
elector being apportioned to the candidate having the largest frac-
tion. Thus in New York, Mr. Blaine would have gotten 17 elec-
toral votes and Mr. Cleveland 18. Other States would have also
divided, more or less evenly; but the result would be that the
choice of President would no longer be restricted to two or three
States, as in our past history, and is likely to be always the case as
long as the whole electoral vote of two or three large pivotal States
must swing to one side or other and determine the result. This
change would avoid the present evil of large sums being spent to
carry the solid electoral vote of "pivotal" States, for there would
cease to be "pivotal" States. At the same time this would avoid the
open gulf into which a per capita ballot by the whole Union would
lead us. While the electoral vote of a State should be divided, pro
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rata, according to the popular vote for each candidate, it is essen-
tial that each State should vote as one district, since its boundaries
are unchangeable. To permit the Legislature of each State to
divide it into electoral districts would simply open up competition in
the art of gerrymandering.
By the Convention of 1787 the term of the President was origi-
nally fixed at seven years and he was made ineligible for re-election.
This was reduced to four years by a compromise that he could be
re-elected without limitation. This was done in the interest of
those who favored a strong government and a long tenure. Wash-
ington imposed a limitation by his example which will not always be
binding. An amendment making the term six years and the Presi-
dent ineligible to re-election has long been desired by a large portion
of the pubic. Indeed, when the Constitutional Convention of the
Union shall assemble, as it must do some day, to remodel our Con-
stitution to fit it to face the dangers and conform to the views of the
people of this age, with the aid of our experience, in the past, it is
more than probable that the powers of the Executive will be more
-restricted. His powers are now greater than those of any sovereign
in Europe. The real restrictions upon Executive power at present
are not in Constitutional provisions, but in the Senate and Judiciary,
which often negative the popular will, which he represents more
accurately than they.
And now we come to the most important of the changes neces-
sary to place the government of the Union in the hands of the peo-
ple. By far the most serious defect and danger in the Constitution
is the appointment of Judges for life, subject to confirmation by
the Senate. It is a far more serious matter than it was when the
Convention of 1787 framed the Constitution. A proposition was
made in the Convention-as we now know from Mr. Madison's
Journal-that the Judges should pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. This was defeated 5 June, receiving the vote of
.only two States. It was renewed no less than three times, i. e., on 6
June, 21 July, and finally again for the fourth time on i August;
and though it had the powerful support of Mr. Madison and Mr.
James Wilson, at no time did it receive the votes of more than three
States. On this last occasion (15 August) Mr. Mercer thus
summed up the thought of the Convention: "He disapproved of the
doctrine, that the Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, should
have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to be
-well and cautiously made, and then to be incontrovertible."
The subsequent action of the Supreme Court in assuming the
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power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional was without 
a
line in the Constitution to authorize it, either expressly or by 
impli-
cation. The Constitution recited carefully and fully the matters
over which the courts should have jurisdiction, and there is nothing,
and after the above vote four times refusing jurisdiction there could
be nothing, indicating any power to declare an act of Congress
unconstitutional and void.
Had the Convention given such power to the courts, it certainly
would not have left its exercise final and unreviewable. It gave the
Congress power to override the veto of the President, though that
veto was expressly given, thus showing that in the last analysis 
the
will of the people, speaking through the legislative power, should
govern. Had the Convention supposed the courts would assume
such power, it would certainly have given Congress some review
over judicial action and certainly would not have made the Judges
irretrievably beyond "the consent of the governed" and regardless
of the popular will by making them appointive, and further clothing
them with the undemocratic prerogative of tenure for life.
Such power does not exist in any other country, and never has.
It is, therefore, not essential to our security. It is not conferred 
by
the Constitution, but, on the contrary, the Convention, as we have
seen, after the fullest debate, four times, on four several days,
refused by a decisive vote to confer such power. The Judges not
only have never exercised such power in England, where there is no
written Constitution, but they do not exercise it in France, Ger-
many, Austria, Denmark, or in any other country which, like them,
has a written Constitution.
A more complete denial of popular control of this government
could not have been conceived than the placing such unreviewable
power in the hands of men, not elected by the people, and holding
office for life. The legal-tender act, the financial policy of the gov-
ernment, was invalidated by one court and then validated by
another, after a change in its personnel. Then the income tax,
which had been held constitutional by the Court for an hundred
years, was again so held, and then by a sudden change of vote 
by
one Judge it was held unconstitutional, nullified and set at naught,
though it had passed by a nearly unanimous vote both Houses 
of
Congress, containing many lawyers who were the equals, if not the
superiors of the vacillating Judge, and had been approved by the
President and voiced the will of the people. This was all nega-
tived (without any warrant in the Constitution for the Court to set
aside an act of Congress) by the vote of one Judge; and thus one
NEXT CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF U. S. 77
hundred million dollars, and more, of annual taxation, was trans-
ferred from those most able to bear it and placed upon the backs of
those who already carried more than their fair share of the burdens
of government. Under an untrue assumption of authority given by
thirty-nine dead men one man nullified the action of Congress and
the President and the will of seventy-five millions of living people,
and in the thirteen years since has taxed the property and labor of
the country, by his sole vote, $1,300,ooo,ooo, which Congress, in
compliance with the public will and relying on previous decisions of
the Court, had decreed should be paid out of the excessive incomes
of the rich.
In England one-third of the revenue is derived from the super-
fluities of the very wealthy, by the levy of a graduated income tax,
and a graduated inheritance tax, increasing the per cent with the
size of the income. The same system is in force in all other civ-
ilized countries. In not one of them would the hereditary monarch
venture to veto or declare null such a tax. In this country, alone,
the people, speaking through their Congress, and with the approval
of their Executive, cannot put in force a single measure of any
nature whatever with assurance that it shall meet with the approval
of the courts; and its failure to receive such approval is fatal, for,
unlike the veto of the Executive, the unanimous vote of Congress
(and the income tax came near receiving such vote) cannot avail
against it. Of what avail shall it be, if Congress shall conform to
the popular demand and enact a "Rate Regulation" bill and the Pres-
ident shall approve it, if five lawyers, holding office for life and not
elected by the people, shall see fit to destroy it, as they did the
income tax law? Is such a government a reasonable one, and can
it be longer tolerated after 120 years of experience have demon-
strated the capacity of the people for self-government? If five
lawyers can negative the will of IOO,OOO,OOO of men, then the art of
government is reduced to the selection of those five lawyers.
A power without limit, except in the shifting views of the Court,
lies in the construction placed upon the Fourteenth Amendment,
which passed, as every one knows, solely to prevent discrimination
against the colored race, has been construed by the Court to confer
upon it jurisdiction to hold any provision of any statute whatever
"not due process of law." This draws the whole body of the
reserved rights of the States into the maelstrom of the Federal
Courts, subject only to such forbearance as the Federal Supreme
Court of the day, or in any particular case, may see fit to exercise.
The limits between State and Federal jurisdiction depend upon the
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views of five men at any given time; and we have a government of
men and not a government of laws, prescribed beforehand.
The preservation of the autonomy of the several States and of
local self-government is essential to the maintenance of our liberties,
which would expire in the grasp of a consolidated despotism. Noth-
ing can save us from this centripetal force but the speedy repeal of
the Fourteenth Amendment or a recasting of its language in terms
that no future court can misinterpret it.
The vast political power now asserted and exercised by the court
to set aside public policies, after their full determination by Con-
gress, cannot safely be left in the hands of any body of men with-
out supervision or control by any other authority whatever. If the
President errs, his mandate expires in four years, and his party as
well as himself is accountable to the people at the ballot-box for his
stewardship. If members of Congress err, they too must account to
their constituents. But the Federal -judiciary hold for life, and
though popular sentiment should change the entire personnel of the
other two great departments of government, a whole generation
must pass away before the people could get control of the Judiciary,
which possesses an irresponsible and unrestricted veto upon the
action of the other departments-irresponsible because impeach-
ment has become impossible, and if it were possible, it could not be
invoked as to erroneous decisions, unless corruption were shown.
The control of the policy of government is thus not in the hands
of the people, but in the power of a small body of men not chosen
by the people and holding for life. In many cases which might be
mentioned, had the Court been elective, men not biased in favor of
colossal wealth would have filled more seats upon the bench, and
if there had been such decision as in the income tax case, long ere
this, under the tenure of a term of years, new incumbents would
have been chosen, who, returning to the former line of decisions,
would have upheld the right of Congress to control the financial
policy of the government in accordance with the will of the people
of this day and age, and not according to the shifting views which
the Court has imputed to language used by the majority of the fifty-
five men who met in Philadelphia in 1787. Such methods of con-
trolling the policy of a government are no whit more tolerable than
the conduct of the augurs of old who gave the permission for leace
or war, for battle or other public movements, by declaring from the
flight of birds, the inspection of the entrails of fowls, or other
equally wise devices, that the omens were lucky or unlucky-the
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rules of such divination being in their own breasts and hence their
decisions beyond remedy.
It may be that this power in the courts, however illegally
grasped originally, has been too long acquiesced in to be now ques-
tioned. If so, the only remedy which can be applied is to make the
Judges elective, and for a term of years, for no people can permit
its will to be denied, and its destinies shaped, by men it did not
choose and over whose conduct it has no control, by reason of its
having no power to change them and select other agents at the close
of a fixed term.
Every Federal Judgeship below the Supreme Court can be abol-
ished by an act of Congress, since the power which creates a Fed-
eral district or circuit can abolish it at will. If Congress can abolish
one, it can abolish all. Several districts have from time to time
been abolished, notably two in i8oI; and \e know that the sixteen
Circuit Judges created by the Judiciary Act of i8ox were abolished
eighteen months later.
It is true that under the stress of a great public sentiment every
United States District and Circuit Judge can be legislated out of
office by a simple act of Congress, and a new system recreated with
new Judges. It is also true, as has been pointed out by distin-
guished lawyers, that while the Supreme Court cannot be thus
abolished, it exercises its appellate functions "with such exceptions
and under such regulations as Congress shall make" (Const., Art.
III, sec. 2), and as Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, it
has often amended it, and can repeal it. Judge Marshall recog-
nized this in Marbury v. Madison, in which case in an obiter opinion
he had asserted the power to declare an act of Congress unconsti-
tutional, for he wound up by refusing the logical result, the issuing
of the mandamus sought, because Congress had not conferred juris-
diction upon the Supreme Court to issue it.
In 1831 the attempt was made to repeal section 25 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, by virtue of which writs of error lay to the State
Supreme Courts in certain cases. Though the section was not
repealed, the repeal was supported and voted for by both Henry
Clay, James K. Polk, and other leaders of both of the great parties
of that day. But what is needed is not the exercise of these powers
'which Congress undoubtedly possesses and in an emergency will
exercise, but a constitutional revision by which the Federal Judges,
like other public servants, shall be chosen by the people for a term
of years.
It may be said that the Federal Judges are now in office for life
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and it would be unjust to dispossess them. So it was with the State
judges in each State when it changed from life judges to judges
elected by the people; but that did not stay the hand of a much-
needed reform.
It must be remembered that when our Federal Constitution was
adopted in 1787, in only one State was the Governor elected by the
people, and the judges in none, and that in most, if not all, the
States, the Legislature, especially the Senate branch, was chosen
by a restricted suffrage. The schoolmaster was not abroad in the
land, the masses were illiterate and government by the people was
a new experiment and property-holders were afraid of it. The dan-
ger to property rights did not come then, as now, from the other
direction-from the corporations and others holding vast accumu-
lations of capital and by its power threatening to crush those own-
ing modest estates.
In the State governments the conditions existing in 1787 have
long since been changed. In all the States the Governor and the
members of both branches of the Legislature have long since been
made elective by manhood -suffrage. In all the forty-five States
save four (Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island), the judges now hold for a term of years, and in three of
these they are removable (as in England) upon a majority vote of
the Legislature, thus preserving a supervision of theii conduct
which is utterly lacking as to the Federal Judiciary. In Rhode
Island the Judges were thus dropped summarily, once, when they
had held an act of the Legislature invalid. In thirty-three States
the judges are elected by the people, in five States by the Legisla-
ture and in seven States they are appointed by the Governor with the
consent of the Senate. Even in England the judges hold office sub-
ject to removal upon the vote of a bare majority in Parliament-
though there the judges have never asserted any power to set aside
an act of Parliament. There the will of the people, when expressed
through their representatives in Parliament, is final. The King
cannot veto it, and no judge has ever dreamed he had power to set
it aside.
There are those who believe and have asserted that corporate
wealth can assert such influence that even if judges are not actually
selected by the great corporations, no judge can take his seat upon
the Federal bench if his nomination and confirmation are opposed
by the allied plutocracy. It has never been charged that such
judges are corruptly influenced. But the passage of a judge from
the bar to the bench does not necessarily destroy his prejudices or
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his predilections. If they go upon the bench knowing that this
potent influence if not used for them, at least withheld its opposition
to their apppointment, or their confirmation, and usually with a nat-
ural and perhaps unconscious bias from having spent their lives at
the bar in advocacy of corporate claims, this will unconsciously,
but effectively, be reflected in the decisions they make. Having
attempted as lawyers to persuade courts to view debated questions
from the standpoint of aggregated wealth, they often end by
believing sincerely in the correctness of such views, and not unnat-
urally put them in force when in turn they themselves ascend the
bench. This trend in Federal decisions has been pronounced.
Then, too, incumbents of seats upon the Federal Circuit and District
bench cannot be oblivious to the influence which procures promo-
tion; and how fatal to confirmation by the plutocratic majority in
the Senate will be the expression of any judicial views not in
accordance with the "safe, sane and sound" predominance of
wealth.
As far back as 1820, Mr. Jefferson had discovered the "sapping
and mining," as he termed it, of the life-tenure, appointive Federal
Judiciary, owing no gratitude to the people for their appointment
and fearing no inconvenience from their conduct, however arbi-
trary, in the discharge of such office. In short, they possess the
autocratic power of absolute irresponsibility. "Step by step, one
goes very far," says the French proverb. This is true of the Fed-
eral Judiciary. Compare their jurisdiction in i8oi, when Marshall
ascended the bench, and their jurisdiction in i9o6. The Constitu-
tion has been remade and rewritten by the judicial glosses put upon
it. Had it been understood in 1787 to mean what it is construed
to mean to-day, it is safe to say that not a single State would have
ratified it.
An elective Judiciary is less partisan, for in many States half
the Judges are habitually taken from each party, and very often in
other States the same men are nominated by both parties, as notably
the recent selection by a Republican convention of a Democratic
successor to Judge Parker. The organs of plutocracy have asserted
that in one State the elective Judges are selected by the party boss.
But they forget that if that is true, he must in such a condition of
affairs name the Governor too, and through the Governor he would
select the appointive judges. If the people are to be trusted to
select the Executive and the Legislature, they are fit to select the
Judges. The people are wiser than the appointing power which,
viewing Judgeships as patronage, has with scarcely an exception
82 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
filled the Federal bench with appointees of its own party. Public
opinion, which is the corner-stone of free government, has no place
in the selection or supervision of the judicial augurs who assume
power to set aside the will of the people when declared by Congress
and the Executive. Whatever their method of divination, equally
with the augurs of old they are a law to themselves and control
events.
As was said by a great lawyer lately deceased, Judge Seymour
D. Thompson, in 1891 (25 Am. Law Review, 288): "If the propo-
sition to make the Federal Judiciary elective instead of appointive
is once seriously discussed before the people, nothing can stay the
growth of that sentiment, and it is almost certain that every ses-
sion of the Federal Supreme Court will furnish material to stimu-
late that growth."
Great aggregations of wealth know their own interests, and it is
very certain that there is no reform and no constitutional amend-
ment that they will oppose more bitterly than this. What, then, is
the interest of all others in regard to it?
Another undemocratic feature of the Constitution is that which
requires all Federal officials to be appointed by the President or
heads of departments. This is a great evil. Overwhelming neces-
sity has compelled the enactment of the civil service law, which has
protected many thousands of minor officials. 'But there has been no
relief as to the 75,000 postmasters. When the Constitution was
adopted there were only 75 postmasters, and it was contemplated
that the President or Postmaster-General would really appoint.
But this constitutional provision is a dead letter. The selection of
this army of 75,000 postmasters, in a large majority of cases, is
made by neither, but in the unconstitutional mode of selection by
Senator, Member of the House, or a political boss. There is no rea-
son why Congress should not be empowered by amendment to
authorize the Department to lay off the territory patronizing each
post-office as a district in which an election shall be held once in
four years, at the time a member of Congress is chosen, and by the
same machinery, the officer giving bond and being subject to the
same supervision as now. Thus the people of each locality will get
the postmaster they prefer, irrespective of the general result in the
Union, relieving the Department at Washington of much call upon
its time, which can be used for the public interest in some better
way; and, besides, it will remove from the election of President and
Members of Congress considerations of public patronage. Elec-
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tions will then more largely turn upon the great issues as to matters
of public policy.
Another obstruction to the effective operation of the popular will
is the fact that, though Congressmen are elected in November, they
-do not take their seats (unless there is a called session) for thirteen
months, and in the meantime the old Congress, whose policy may
have been repudiated at the polls, sits and legislates in any event
till 4 March following. This surely needs amendment, which for-
tunately can be done by statute. In England, France and other
countries the old Parliament ceases before the election, and the new
Assembly meets at once and puts the popular will into law.
In thus discussing the defects of the Federal Constitution I have
but exercised the right of the humblest citizen. Few will deny that
defects exist. I have indicated what, in my opinion, are the reme-
dies. As to this, many will differ. If better can be found, let us
adopt them. But could the matter be more appropriately discussed
than on the spot where the original Constitution was debated?
For my part, I believe in popular government. The remedy for
the halting, half-way popular government which we have is more
democracy. When some one observed to Mr. Gladstone that the
"people are not always right," he replied, "No; but they are rarely
wrong." When they are wrong, their intelligence and their inter-
ests combine to make them correct the wrong. But when rulers,
whether Kings, or life Judges, or great corporations, commit an
error against the interest of the masses, there is no such certainty of
correction.
The growth of this country in population and in material wealth
has made it the marvel of the ages.
"But what avail the plow or sail,
Or land or life, if freedom fail?"
The government and the destinies of a great people should
always be kept in their own hands.
Walter Clark, LL.D.
